• What is the optimal breadth of patent protection?
Sketch of the model:
• horizontal differentiation, • a patentholder (H) and competitors, • Breadth: distance of the product spectrum away from the patentholder's product where competing firms are allowed, • Consumers prefer the patented products at equal prices, • H and consumers are located at 0, • Consumers' have a. travel cost per unit of distance, t; b. reservation price, m.
Graph: 3 consumers, identical m, different t • Consumer 1 is indifferent between -buying H's product located at 0 at price p * , -and buying the product from a competitor; the travel cost is t 1 b.
• Consumer 2 buys from a competitor because p * > t 2 b, i.e., it is cheaper to travel to b and buy from a competitor.
• Consumer 3 buys from H because p * < t 3 b, i.e., it is cheaper to buy the patented product rather than travelling to b. • If perfect competition: maximum welfare, no loss.
• Comparison of the patent situation with the perfectly competitive situation.
Two kinds of welfare losses (W L):
• W L 1 : consumers who shift to less preferred varieties. These consumers face travel costs (e.g., consumer 2, who incurs travel cost t 2 b)
• W L 1 : consumers drop out of the market; too low reservation price.
-e.g., if the reservation price of consumer 3 is below the price charged by H (p * > m) he will not buy. -Or if t 2 b > m, consumer 2 will not buy.
• Assumption: there is a minimum profit level that makes H invest in R&D.
• Patent policy maker have two instruments:
-patent breadth, -patent length;
• A long but narrow patent can provide as much profit as a short but broad patent.
• Problem: How to determine the optimal mixture of breadth and length that is optimal from a social viewpoint?
• The distribution of t, and the distribution of m turn out to be decisive for the optimal mix.
• Extreme cases: -narrow patents with long life are optimal when consumers face identical travel costs; -broad patents with adjusted life are optimal when the reservation prices are identical.
• Why?
• A1: all consumers face identical travel costs.
H sets p * = tb − ε. Suppose that all consumers have the same travel cost t 1 (see graph), thus p *
• Objective of policy maker: reduce W L 2 ; set very narrow patent to force H to reduce the price. The lifetime will be adjusted such as to give the given reward to H.
• A2: all consumers have identical reservation prices. H will set p * = m (comparable to perfect price discrimination which is commonly known to cause no welfare loss, compared to perfect competition).
• Objective of the policy maker: reduce W L 1 ; set very broad patent in order to reduce W L 1 . The lifetime must be adjusted in order to provide the minimum profit level required.
